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Abstract— Taxpayers feel that tax is a cost that reduces 
their economic power and thus, taxpayers show resistance 
through tax evasion. Therefore, tax authorities in Indonesia 
need to understand the behavior of taxpayers to anticipate 
their involvement in tax evasion. From this situation, this 
study aims to classify taxpayers into groups with similar 
behavior toward tax evasion. This classification is based on 
taxpayers intention and attitude as well as a combination of 
several factors: subjective norms, relations with tax 
authority, and distributive justice. 
We used Cluster Analysis Method to analyze data in 
this study. This method classifies object or variable into 
several groups in which they have resembling attribute and 
characteristic. Data were collected using a self-
administered questionnaire both from direct interviews 
and from the google form application. 
Clustering results in five groups of taxpayers, namely 
Commitment, Sycophant, Submission, Offender, and 
Defrauder groups. The commitment is a group of taxpayers 
who obeys tax regulations voluntarily. The Sycophant are 
taxpayers who tend to take advantage of their good 
relations with the tax authorities in completing tax 
obligations. The Submission are taxpayers who initially 
want to commit tax evasion but in fact still choose to obey. 
Offender are taxpayers who commit tax evasion by 
exploiting weaknesses in tax regulations. The last group is 
Defrauder, namely taxpayers who have the intention to 
commit tax evasion from the beginning. The results of this 
study will show a pattern of similarities in taxpayer 
behavior that can help tax authorities in Indonesia to 
formulate tax regulations in anticipation of taxpayer 
evasion action. 
Keywords—taxpayers; tax compliance; tax evasion; tax 
behavior 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Tax obligation does not talk about the taxation system only 
which includes three things, namely: tax policy, tax laws, and 
tax administration [1]. But it also involves compulsory good 
behavior itself. Therefore, various scientific perspectives, 
namely economics, psychology and law enforcement try to 
solve the secrets of tax compliance behavior. 
The study of tax compliance often centers on an analysis 
of the factors that affect taxpayer compliance from various 
scientific perspectives. For example [2] who explained the 
factor that affects taxpayer compliance is sanctions. Or research 
by [3] who emphasized economic factors, namely cost and 
benefit as taxpayer considerations in implementing tax 
compliance. Research by [4] proved that three factors, namely 
the attitude of taxpayers, subjective norms and behavioral 
control affect the intention of taxpayers to obey. [5] used the 
factors of trust, integrity and professionalism of tax officials as 
indicators of taxpayer compliance. Some of the studies above 
indirectly categorize taxpayer compliance behavior based on 
four categories, namely deterrence compliance, norms and ethic 
compliance, fairness compliance, and economic compliance . 
Behavioral studies were also carried out by [6], developed 
a tax compliance model based on what is called a motivational 
posture which is a collection of beliefs, attitudes, choices, 
interests, feelings that together communicate the level at which 
individuals accept regulator policies in principle and support the 
regulator's function in carrying out its duties. The study 
classified taxpayers based on five criteria, those are 1) 
commitment, it is compliant taxpayers with their own 
awareness, 2) capitulation, it is taxpayers are obedient but what 
they are, 3) resistance, it is taxpayers who are not compliant and 
do open resistance, 4) disengagement , it is taxpayers who show 
psychological separation from the taxpayers' authority, and 5) 
game playing, it is taxpayers who avoid tax by utilizing 
loopholes in tax regulations. While the tax authorities in Canada 
in a survey mapped six taxpayer compliance groups, namely: 1) 
altruistic compliers, namely taxpayers who are obedient and 
against fraud taxation, 2) deferent compliers, it is compliant 
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taxpayers because of reluctant, 3) pseudo compliers, it is 
pseudo-compliant taxpayers 4) situational non-compliers, it is 
compliant or non-compliant taxpayers are situational, 5) 
potential non-compliers, it is potentially non-compliant 
taxpayers , and rebels compliers, that is non-compliant 
taxpayers [7]. However, [8] realized that these perspectives 
have not been able to reveal the secret to answer the puzzle of 
taxpayer compliance behavior that has not been solve. 
In the context of this study, the typology of tax compliance 
is based on several factors, those are; Subjective Norms, 
Fairness, Perceived Tax Evasion , Technology, Tax Advances , 
Tax Compliance, Tax Evasion. The purpose of this study is to 
divide taxpayers into several groups. In addition, to find out 
more about the factors that make up the classification of 
taxpayers into certain types. 
II. RESEARCH QUESTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Prospect Theory 
Prospect Theory generally has the meaning people are 
more sensitive to prospective losses compared to prospective 
profits of the same magnitude. This theory was stated by [10], 
where they provide behavior-based alternatives for decision 
making theory. The focus of this theory is on how decisions are 
taken (descriptive approach). Prospect Theory assumes that 
when calculating the value of an expected prospect in the 
future, individuals often increase or decrease their probabilities. 
Prospect theory is often associated with ethics adopted by 
someone. Ethics itself is defined as a normative system of 
behavior rules which is developed to provide guidance in social 
or interpersonal arrangements [11]. In the Prospect Theory is 
explained that individuals tend to have high sensitivity to losses 
compared to profits even in the same amount. Individuals will 
tend to make decisions that can provide higher certainty where 
their thought is influenced by the ethics they profess. This is 
because ethics forms the individual's mindset to make the most 
beneficial and good decisions for him or her. Likewise in 
implementing tax compliance, both prospect theory and ethics 
will influence how taxpayers carry out their tax obligations. 
[12] highlights three basic views about the ethics of tax evasion, 
among of them are: 
• tax evasion is considered unethical; 
• There is never an obligation to pay taxes because the 
state is illegitimate and has no moral authority to 
take anything from anyone; and 
• tax evasion may be ethical in some situations and 
unethical in other situations. 
From the explanation above, it can be concluded that 
individual behavior in carrying out their tax obligations has 
various forms of views. Each form of view has different results 
if it is associated with embezzlement or tax evasion. Taxpayers 
will tend to take decisions that benefit for taxpayers themselves. 
For example, in a profit situation, taxpayers who expect tax 
cuts will avoid risk and rarely decide to avoid taxes. However, 
in a loss situation, taxpayers who are in debt have a desire to 
reduce the amount of money owed and more often decide to 
avoid taxes [13] [14] [15] [16]. What choices and actions that 
are chosen by a person will be influenced by several factors. 
Prospect theory and ethics are one of these factors, Individual 
will consider how beneficial if he or she makes a decision. In 
the next section will be explained the factors that influence 
taxpayers in making decisions regarding the implementation of 
tax obligations in detail. 
B. Subjective Norms 
Subjective Norms have an understanding of the influence 
from other people which was referred [17]. Individuals or 
groups such as peers, coworkers, family and friends can have an 
impact on other people making decisions based on how they 
understand behavior, whether they will support it or not, and 
how far people are motivated to adopt themselves [17].  
1) Personal Norms 
Personal Norms discuss about one's moral values, it can 
also be defined as standards or self-based expectations for 
behavior that flows from the values in a person self. Adherence 
to these norms allows individuals to feel good about their 
behavior and about themselves. Personal norms can be defined 
as beliefs that are rooted about what someone should or 
shouldn't be done. 
2) Social Norms 
Social Norms can be said as norms that relates to the 
surrounding environment, it can also be defined as ‘‘ rules and 
standards that are understood by group members, and it guides 
and / or limits social behavior without the force of law. [18] 
[19] Through social norms, it can be found several factors that 
influence the behavior of taxpayers. The first factor and the 
most influential factor is the personal moral beliefs of the 
Taxpayers themselves, along with their beliefs that are close 
and influenced by the surrounding environment (for example; 
friends and other important people). The second significant 
factor represents the community's view of appropriate behavior. 
So it can also be said that social norms help to explain the 
intention of tax compliance. 
C. Fairness 
[20] distributed justice into two types namely procedural 
fairness and distributive fairness. Social psychology studies 
examine more about the existing social dilemmas in 
determining priorities and cooperation of an individual. An 
individual needs to think about the impact of actions on society 
[20]. Taxpayers act on action which is able to give and create 
an impact on society.  
1) Distributive Tax Fairness 
Distributive fairness refers to fair resources exchange 
which includes costs and benefits [21] by comparing individual 
contributions and the results of contributions [22]. Resources 
include material or non-material, positive or negative such as 
tax burden. 
a) Horizontal Fairness (HF)  
Horizontal fairness is an individual with the same 
income is taxed at the same rate or bears the same tax 
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obligation [23]. Horizontal fairness recommends that in order 
that income tax system is considered fair, taxpayers in the 
same economic position must pay the same amount of tax. 
b) Vertical Fairness (VF) 
Vertical Fairness distinguishes individuals from different 
incomes [23]. Total tax debt depends on the total income 
which can be received. Taxpayers with higher income must 
pay higher taxes and vice versa. if the income is higher, the 
proportion of taxes which must be paid is big. 
c) Exchange Fairness (EF) 
Exchange fairness is contributions exchange and benefits 
between taxpayers and government. This tax fairness 
dimension states that taxpayers will have a fair perception 
toward income tax system if the benefits received from the 
government are fair compared to their contributions. It can be 
said that taxpayers won't be willing to comply with tax laws if 
there is a perceived imbalance between tax contributions and 
the provision of public goods and services [24] [25]. 
2) Procedural Tax Fairness 
Procedural fairness focuses on the perception of whether 
fair procedures and services are carried out by the authorities 
[26] [27]. If the community considers that the method for 
distributing resources is fair, then procedural fairness can be 
said high. In general, procedural fairness is an important factor 
in determining relationship between authority and public [28]. 
If someone feels that authority is carrying out fair procedures, 
they have greater trust in authority. 
a) Quality Decision (QD) 
Studies showed that the more taxpayers are satisfied with 
the quality of public services, by balance among burden, 
received public goods  and their tax obligations to the state, then 
it is going to be less they are willing to avoid taxes [29]. Then, 
more decisions which are free of bias, stable, neutral, respectful, 
sympathetic and honest, then it is less in the tendency to avoid 
taxes [29] [30]. 
b) Quality Relation (QR) 
Quality Relations (QR) is replacing service quality and / or 
customer satisfaction as the main source of superior 
performance and competitive advantage. According to [31] QR 
is one of the higher order constructs, which is now widely 
accepted. 
D. Perceived Tax Evasion (PTE) 
One of perception which appears in the environment of 
taxpayers is if people believe that officers make equitable 
distributions, then they themselves are going to be more willing 
to contribute, while attempted tax avoidance is going to affect 
tax compliance negatively. 
E. Technology 
The current taxation system is influenced by technology. 
[32] argued that design in an optimal tax system requires 
consideration, not only through changes in tax collection 
technology but also regarding how technology can change the 
economic environment in which the government tries to collect 
income through tax revenue. [32] noted in an initial review of 
technology and taxation in developing countries that "if we 
want to avoid a cycle of unfulfilled expectations, we need to 
have a clear strategy for administrative reform, which is far 
broader and more sophisticated than only implementing 
information technology. 
F. Tax Advances (TA) 
Tax Advances can also be interpreted as tax refund 
(restitution). Tax advances can occur when the tax owed is 
greater than the tax credit on taxes which have been already 
paid by the taxpayer (over paid).  
G. Tax Compliance  
Tax Compliance is behavior of taxpayers both individuals 
and entities in complying with tax regulations to carry out tax 
administration [33]. Tax compliance itself can be seen from 
how taxpayers have NPWP, calculate and deposit taxes which 
must be paid, report their tax returns completely and on time, 
and pay tax in arrears. Taxpayer Compliance can be divided 
into two, those are formal compliance and material compliance 
[34]. Formal compliance is when Taxpayers comply with all 
applicable tax laws. Whereas Material Provisions are when 
Taxpayers are able to fulfill all material tax provisions in 
accordance with the Taxation Law. 
H. Tax Evasion 
Tax Evasion is taxpayers behavior who embezzle taxes and 
give side effects from taxation which must be avoided as much 
as possible because it will give bad effect on the economy of 
country [35]. Tax evasion will give the same effect as 
discriminatory tax treatment toward homogeneous goods and 
cause price increases relatively toward goods produced by 
sector where tax avoidance is not possible. The optimal tax 
design must be taken into account by noticing that different 
taxes must be overcome with different levels. In addition, the 
principles of efficient tax design must be revised to take into 
account the possibility of a tax is able to be avoided as a result 
of the tax design [36]. 
I. Previous Research Review 
The results of studies on the relationship among tax 
standards, tax fairness and tax compliance raised the question 
of whether among taxpayers it was possible to distinguish 
groups with similar assessments about distributive and 
procedural tax fairness, personal and social tax norms, 
evaluation of other taxpayers behavior and similar experiences 
from tax benefits, and tax evasion. This approach is 
appropriate for the study of tax behavior proposed by [37] [38]. 
Braithwaite distinguishes five types of motivational postures 
against taxes: commitment, capitulation, resistance, 
disengagement and game-playing. 
Commitment posture is based on a sense of moral 
obligation and treatment of paying taxes as an act of good 
intentions. In capitulation postures, collaboration with tax 
authorities is the result of their perception as representative of 
legitimate authorities. In resistance posture, the tax authority is 
considered to have a supervisory attitude " which oriented on" 
so that it encourages tax decisions based on this unpleasant 
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situation. Resistance postures communicate strong opposition 
to the tax authorities; its source is dissatisfaction with tax 
system. Misalignment also reflects a negative attitude towards 
the tax authority and exacerbates social distance between 
taxpayer and tax authority. Game-playing focuses on finding 
ways to use tax laws to further individual benefits. 
Study had shown that commitment, capitulation, resistance 
were related to voluntary tax compliance while disengagement 
and game-playing were related to tax compliance forcedly 
[24]. In addition, previous traditional research also sparked that 
attitudes of taxpayers often cannot be related to their behavior. 
So when someone says a thing, it will often be different from 
the behavior that he or she did.  it is similar with attitude of 
taxpayer who behaves as if obeying the rules, has not 
determined that the taxpayer is truly obedient to his or her tax 
obligations and does not  do tax avoidance. 
In contrast to previous studies, our study will focus on 
grouping taxpayers categorized by how they behave in carrying 
out tax compliance. The behavior is influenced by several 
variables, including Personal Norms (PN), Social Norms (SN), 
Distributive Tax Fairness, Horizontal Fairness (HF), Vertical 
Fairness (VF), Exchange Fairness (EF), Procedural Tax 
Fairness, Quality Decision (QD), Quality Relation (QR), 
Perceived Tax Evasion (PTE), Technology, Tax Advances 
(TA). 
The division of taxpayer categories in Indonesia has not 
been clearly identified. While taxpayers in Indonesia often do 
tax avoidance and some of them do tax evasion. This is proven 
by the program which Indonesian government has just 
conducted, namely Tax Amnesty. Tax Amnesty was first 
carried out in 2016. According to Kemenkeu.go.id 2016, Tax 
Amnesty was carried out with expectation there is a potential 
for revenue to increase in the National Budget ( Indonesia: 
APBN) in this year or in later years which will make 
Indonesian State Budget more stable. If APBN is more stable 
in its revenue and government's ability to spend or for 
expenditure is also greater, it will automatically help a lot of 
development programs. In the process, many taxpayers are 
taking part in tax amnesty program, so it can be said that 
taxpayers in Indonesia have a tendency to carry out tax evasion 
or tax avoidance. By finding the available data, the formulation 
of problem in this study is typology of taxpayers in Indonesia. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
A. Analysis Model 
The analytical model used in this research was quantitative 
data analysis with taxpayer and tax evader typology 
independent variables which were divided into Personal Norms 
(PN), Social Norms (SN), Horizontal Fairness (HF), Vertical 
Fairness (VF), Exchange Fairness (VF) EF), Quality Decision 
(QD), Quality Relations (QR), Perceived Tax Evasion (PTE), 
Technology, Tax Advances (TA), Tax Compliance, Tax 
Evasion. For the dependent variable used in this study was 
taxpayer. The analysis model of this research could be 
described in the following figure: 
Variable Independent  
Variable 
Dependent 
Typology Taxpayer (X)  
Taxpayer 
(Y) 
-Personal Norms (PN)  
-Social Norms (SN)  
-Horizontal Fairness (HF)  
-Vertical Fairness (VF)  
-Exchange Fairness (EF)  
-Quality Decision (QD)  
-QualitY Relation (QR)  
-Perceived Tax Evasion (PTE)  
-Technology Involvement (TI)  
-Tax Advance (Tad)  
-Tax Evasion (TE)  
-Tax Compliance (TC)  
 
Figure 1 Analysis Model (Source: Result of Author's 
Processing, 2019) 
B. Definition of Operational Variables 
1) Independent Variable 
In this research, tax payer and tax evader typologies had 
function as independent variables. The typology of tax payer 
and tax evader in this study was measured by Personal Norms 
(PN), Social Norms (SN), Horizontal Fairness (HF), Vertical 
Fairness (VF), Exchange Fairness (EF), Quality Decision 
(QD), Quality Relations (QR), Perceived Tax Evasion (PTE), 
Technology, Tax Advances (TA), Tax Compliance, Tax 
Evasion. 
a) Personal Norms (PN) 
Measurement used survey with six statements which are 
measured or assessed by Likert Scale (5 scale) where is 
“disagree” and 5 is “agree”. One of statement sample in this 
measurement is “in my opinion is receiving salary without taz 
deduction is a violation” (disagree-agree). The results of the 
assessment of six questions will be added up and divided by 
the total question (6). The number which becomes the result of 
calculation above is the Index PN. Large indexes illustrate that 
taxpayers have very high norms or moral obligations in paying 
taxes and do not have the potention to carry out tax evasion. 
While the index with low numbers illustrates that taxpayers do 
not have norms or feel that moral obligations towards taxes. 
b) Social Norms (SN)  
Measurement use a survey by using five statements which 
are measured or assessed by Likert Scale (5 scale) where 1 is 
"disagree" and 5 is "agree". One of statement sample in this 
measurement is "According to others is receiving salary 
without tax deduction is a violation" (disagree-agree). The 
results of five statements assessment will be added up and 
divided by the total of questions (5). The number which 
becomes the result above is Index SN. Index with large 
numbers illustrates that the environment or people around 
taxpayers have very high norms or moral obligations in paying 
taxes and do not have potential to carry out tax evasion. While 
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the index with low numbers illustrates that the environment or 
people around taxpayers do not have moral norms or 
obligations in paying taxes. 
c) Horizontal Fairness (HF) 
The measurement use a survey with the statement 
"Taxpayer with the same amount of income as I pay (1: less, 5: 
more) than I paid" which is measured or assessed by a Likert 
Scale (5 scale). The results of exist numbers are an evaluation 
of taxpayers against other taxpayers with the same income 
level. 
d) Vertical Fairness (VF)  
Measurement use a survey with the statement "Taxpayers 
with a higher amount of income pay taxes (1: lower, 5: higher) 
than I paid" which is measured or assessed by Likert Scale (5 
scale). The results of exist numbers are an evaluation of 
taxpayers against other taxpayers with higher income levels. 
e) Exchange Fairness (EF)  
Measurement use a survey with four statements which are 
measured or assessed by a Likert Scale (4 scale) where 1 is 
"disagree" and 4 is "agree". One of statement sample in this 
measurement is "The amount of tax which I pay is proportional 
to the benefits provided by the government" (disagree-agree). 
The numbers which become the result of calculation above is 
Index EF. Index with large numbers illustrates that taxpayers 
feel the tax they pay has been reciprocated with fair benefits by 
the state. While the low numbers illustrate that taxpayers feel 
the tax they pay is not comparable with the benefits they get 
from the state. 
f) Quality Decision (QD) 
 Measurement use a survey with five statements which are 
measured or assessed by Likert Scale (5 scale) where 1 is 
"disagree" and 5 is "agree". One of statement sample in this 
measurement is "The decision taken by the Tax Officer is for 
public interest" (disagree-agree). The numbers which become 
the result of calculation above is Index QD. Large indexes 
illustrate that taxpayers feel happy or satisfied with decisions 
made by the DJP or tax officials. While low numbers illustrate 
that taxpayers are not satisfied or not happy with the decisions 
taken by the DJP or tax officials. 
g) Quality Relation (QR)  
Measurement use a survey with five statements which are 
measured or assessed by Likert Scale (5 scale) where 1 is 
"disagree" and 5 is "agree". One of statement sample in this 
measurement is "The decision taken by the Tax Officer is for 
public interest" (disagree-agree). The numbers which become 
the result of calculation above is Index QD. Large indexes 
illustrate that taxpayers feel happy or satisfied with decisions 
made by the DJP or tax officials. While low numbers illustrate 
that taxpayers are not satisfied or not happy with the decisions 
taken by the DJP or tax officials because they are considered 
detrimental. 
h) Perceived Tax Evasion (PTE) 
Measurement use a survey with 2 questions which are 
measured or assessed by Likert Scale (5 scale) where 1 is 
"Never" and 5 is "Always". One of statement sample in this 
measurement is "As a taxpayer, you increase costs that reduce 
taxable income" (never - always). The numbers which become 
the result of calculation above is the Index Perceived Tax 
Evasion (Index PTE). Index with large numbers illustrates that 
the environment or people around taxpayers have an indication 
or often do tax evasion while low numbers illustrate that the 
environment or people around taxpayers have no indication or 
are not involved in tax evasion. This can affect the behavior of 
taxpayers to participate in the majority of votes. 
i) Technology Involvement (TI) 
Measurement use a survey with six statements which are 
measured or assessed by a Likert Scale (5 scale) where 1 is 
"disagree" and 5 is "agree". One of statement sample in this 
measurement is "The use of information technology in the 
taxation system increases my trust in the government 
"(disagree-agree). The numbers which become the result of 
calculation above is Index TI. Large indexes illustrate that 
taxpayers agree with the application of technology and consider 
that technology is very helpful both in efficiency and 
transparency. While low numbers illustrate that taxpayers do 
not agree with the application of technology with an indication 
there is something hidden. 
j) Tax Advances (Tad) 
Measurement use a survey with four questions divided into 
two parts. Part A is measured by 2 questions (Have you 
received tax refunds in last 2 years?; Do you tend to find More 
Pay in SPT reporting?) And measured with Yes (1) or No (0). 
Part B is measured by 2 questions (Do you have to pay 
additional taxes in the last 2 years?; Are you likely to find 
Underpayment in SPT reporting?) And measured by Yes (1) or 
No (0). Difference from Amount A minus Amount B will be 
Index TAd. Indexes with numbers close to 2 or positive indicate 
the existence of effect of tax advances or the existence of 
restitution. While numbers approaching -2 or negative indicate 
no effect of tax advances because the majority of taxpayers 
experience underpayment. 
k) Tax Compliance (TC) 
Measurement use a survey with nine statements which are 
measured or assessed by Likert Scale (5 scale) where 1 is 
"disagree" and 5 is "agree". One of statement sample in this 
measurement is "I will not decrease my income in order that 
income tax decreases, then use it for other costs" (disagree-
agree). The numbers which become the result of calculation 
above is Index TC. Indexes with large numbers illustrate that 
taxpayers have a high level of tax compliance while low 
numbers illustrate that taxpayers have a low level of tax 
compliance. 
l) Tax Evasion (TE) 
Measurement use a survey with three statements which are 
measured or assessed by indicators Yes (1) and no (0). One of 
statement sample in this measurement is "I have ever earned 
income and not reported to the tax office" (Yes-No). The 
numbers which become the result of calculation from above is 
Index Tax Evasion (Index TE). Indexes with large numbers 
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illustrate that taxpayers have the potential to carry out tax 
evasion and vice versa.  
2) Dependent Variable  
In this study, taxpayer functions as dependent variable. 
Dependent variable is dependent variable which is influenced 
by the independent variable. In measuring the taxpayer use the 
results of a questionnaire distributed by the author. 
C. Type and Data Sources 
The type of data used in this study was quantitative data in 
the form of questionnaire results which were distributed and 
then processed. The object used in this study was taxpayers who 
conducted business and free work in the territory of Indonesia. 
Therefore, the data in this study were obtained from the results 
of the questionnaire distributed via the link. The data taken in 
the form of a questionnaire containing typology of taxpayers. 
D. Data Collection 
Collecting data in this study were obtained from the results 
of questionnaires that had been distributed and journals 
obtained from several websites where became sources and 
references in writing this research. 
E. Population and Sample 
This research was conducted to 101 taxpayers who did 
business and free work in the territory of Indonesia. Sampling 
used a purposive sampling method, where samples were taken 
used certain criteria, those were: 
1. Taxpayers who conducted business and free work 
2. Taxpayers who conducted business and free work in 
the territory of Indonesia 
3. Taxpayers who have TIN (Indonesia: NPWP) 
4. Taxpayers who calculated, deposit and report taxes 
which must be paid. 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
 
TABLE 4.1 NUMBER OF CASES IN EACH CLUSTER 
Number of Cases in each Cluster 
Cluster 1 35.000 
 2 19.000 
 3 22.000 
 4 12.000 
 5 13.000 
Valid 101.000 
Missing 1.000 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 Distance between Final Cluster Centers 
 
Distances between Final Cluster Centers 
Cluster 
Commitm 
ent 
Defrau 
der 
Offend 
er 
Submis 
sion 
Opport 
unist 
Commitm 
ent 
2.665 2.948 3.344 2.981 
Defrauder 2.665  2.428 4.365 2.671 
Offender 2.948 2.428  2.455 2.711 
Submissi 
on 
3.344 4.365 2.455 
 
3.772 
Sycophan 
t 
2.981 2.671 2.711 3.772 
 
 
Data analysis in this research was carried out in two stages. 
The first step was cluster analysis using K-cluster. The second 
stage gave the naming for each formed cluster based on the 
definition of each variables which were collected in each 
cluster. K-cluster analysis was used to identify the group of 
taxpayers. Data processing differentiates groups of taxpayers 
into five groups. It could be seen through Table 4.1 that most 
respondents were classified into the first cluster (N = 35). The 
next sequence was the third cluster (N = 22), the second cluster 
(N = 19), the fifth cluster (N = 13) and finally the fourth cluster 
(N = 12). The respondents in Table 1.1 were obtained from 
filling out the questionnaire distributed via Google Form. 
Table 4.2 illustrates the distance of differences between 
clusters. This difference is caused by several variables as a 
result of respondents' answers. From table 4.2 the most distant 
difference lied between the Submission cluster and Defrauder 
cluster. That is because there are different reasons for 
addressing tax obligations. If we look in Submission cluster, 
taxpayer tends to continue to carry out tax obligations even 
though most of the variables show negative numbers. 
Meanwhile, if we look in Defrauder cluster, most of the 
variables show a positive number but the taxpayer still conducts 
tax evasion. From these result it can be concluded that the 
distance of difference between clusters is far adrift due to 
opposing results both in terms of numbers to an indication of 
the purpose of the cluster. 
If we look in the lowest difference in distance, it's resulted 
offender cluster and defrauder cluster have the highest 
similarity. This is caused due to both of clusters are found there 
are similarities in behavior although there are differences in 
reasons for doing the behavior. In the offender cluster, 
taxpayers directly in front of the public do tax avoidance. The 
behavior itself is supported by the results of the numbers on 
each variable which indicate the value is not so high in the tax 
compliance variable, while in tax evader variable is produced a 
high enough value. On the other hand, in defrauders cluster, 
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taxpayers do tax avoidance in secret. As explained earlier, the 
numbers on defrauder variable mostly show positive results 
which show that in terms of justice, morals, norms, and the 
quality of tax officials have supported taxpayers to obey. But in 
reality, taxpayers in defrauder cluster still do tax avoidance. So 
it can be concluded that both of clusters only have differences 
in the way they show their behavior in avoiding taxes. 
 
TABLE 4.3 FINAL CLUSTER CENTERS
 
a) Cluster Commitment 
Commitment is a condition where a person dedicates 
himself to carry out a certain obligation or activity without 
coercion from the surrounding environment. In this cluster, 
taxpayers are classified into their behavior who have a 
willingness to carry out tax obligations on their own 
willingness. This can be seen from the level of tax compliance 
which is very high (Tax Compliance: 3.997) if compared to 
other clusters. Measurement of taxpayer compliance itself can 
be seen through the openness of taxpayers related to income 
which is earned and the accuracy of calculating income tax 
which must be paid. In addition, taxpayers also have social 
morals (Social Norms: 3,7) and high individual morals 
(Personal Norms: 4,171) as measured from social 
environmental beliefs and taxpayers themselves that paying 
taxes is part of the responsibilities which must be done. 
Taxpayers feel justice in various aspects such as benefits 
obtained from the government (Exchange Fairness: 2,829), the 
same amount of tax debt (different) among fellow taxpayers 
with the same income (different) so that in tax payment 
taxpayers do not feel disadvantaged (Horizontal Fairness: 2,9; 
Vertical Fairness: 3,9). Social influence has an important role in 
shaping someone's compliance. Compliance that is formed not 
only with himself or herself but also with social considerations 
can minimize doubts and demands from the authorities. It can 
be concluded that taxpayers are reluctant to do tax avoidance 
because it is supported by various variables and is realized at a 
low level of tax avoidance. 
 
b) Cluster Defrauder 
Defrauder is a behavior where someone commits fraud by 
deceiving others. In this cluster, taxpayers are classified in 
behavior which pretends to comply with tax obligations, while 
in fact they avoid tax obligations. This can be seen from the  
high level of compliance (Tax Compliance: 3,608) as evidenced 
by the openness of the Taxpayer related to the income earned. 
Taxpayers also have a good relationship and high trust in 
decisions taken by tax officials (Quality Relations: 3,961; 
Quality Decision: 3,7) which can be seen from the integrity of 
tax officials and their decisions related to public interests. But 
on the other hand, taxpayers in this cluster actually do Tax 
Evasion (Tax Evasion: 2.8) which can be seen from the 
taxpayers maximize costs that may be deducted by violating 
applicable tax regulations. So it can be concluded that taxpayers 
look obedient because they report all their income but instead 
use costs that should not be deducted to avoid paying taxes. In 
addition, a good relationship with tax officials is also used by 
taxpayers to facilitate taxpayers avoiding their tax obligations. 
From there it appears that taxpayers only pretend to be obedient 
but in reality they are not. 
c) Cluster Offender 
Offender is a behavior where someone commits an 
illegal act. In this cluster, taxpayers are classified into behavior 
which does not carry out tax obligations properly. This can be 
seen from the absence of contradictory results such as the 
Defrauder cluster, it is clear that the level of fairness 
(Horizontal Fairness: 2.7; Vertical Fairness: 3.0; Exchange 
Final Cluster Centers 
 Cluster 
 Commitment Defrauder Offender Submission Opportunist 
Perceived Tax Evasion 2.7 4.0 3.6 2.3 4.0 
Horizontal Fairness 2.9 3.9 2.7 2.0 2.2 
Vertical Fairness 3.9 4.3 3.0 1.9 2.5 
Exchange Fairness 2.829 2.772 2.682 2.000 3.000 
Tax Evasion .8 2.8 2.4 1.1 2.8 
Personal Norms 4.171 3.877 3.356 3.639 4.282 
Tax Advances -.3 -.1 .0 -.1 -.5 
Social Norms 3.7 3.7 2.9 3.1 4.3 
Quality Decision 3.9 3.7 2.9 2.7 4.1 
Quality Relation 4.089 3.961 3.148 2.896 4.163 
Tax Compliance 3.997 3.608 3.141 2.926 3.530 
Technology Involvement 4.181 3.956 3.492 3.417 4.487 
Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research, volume 103
66
Fairness: 3.2) and tax compliance (Tax Compliance: 3,141) 
have a fairly low value. These results indicate that taxpayers 
deliberately do not calculate and report their income honestly 
and believe that taxes paid among taxpayers are unfair. 
Likewise with lower individual and social morals (Personal 
Norms: 3,356; Social Norms: 2,9) compared to other clusters 
which show that the surrounding environment and taxpayers 
feel that paying taxes is not their responsibility. Therefore it 
can be concluded that in this cluster Taxpayers do tax 
avoidance openly because they believe that complying with 
tax obligations is not their responsibility. 
d) Cluster Submission 
Submission is a condition where someone is forced to do a 
certain activity or obligation. In this cluster, taxpayers are 
classified in their behavior, who are determined to pay taxes, 
even though the level of fairness and relationship with tax 
officials tends to be low (Horizontal Fairness: 2; Vertical 
Fairness: 1.9; Exchange Fairness: 2; Quality Relations: 2,896; 
Quality Decision: 2.7). This shows that the surrounding 
environment and taxpayers feel that between taxpayers are not 
subject to the same or unfair amount of tax. In addition, 
taxpayers feel that tax officials do not have integrity and do not 
prioritize the public interest in decision making. In the tax 
evasion cluster level is also classified as very low (Tax Evasion: 
1.1) but on the other hand tax compliance also does not show 
high results (Tax Compliance: 2,926) so it can be said that the 
taxpayers in this cluster do not violate regulations in carrying 
out their tax obligations but also does not report all of their 
income honestly. It also can be assumed by the delay in 
payment of the tax itself due to factors related to poor tax 
officials. Other things can also be caused by the injustice 
between wages received by someone and the obligations which 
must be paid, so that causing doubts or unwillingness to pay 
obligations. However, because taxpayers have good morals 
(Personal Norms: 3,639; Social Norms: 3,1), taxpayers in this 
cluster still do taxpayers. 
e) Cluster Opportunist  
Opportunist is a behavior where someone uses a situation to 
get profit. In this cluster, taxpayers are classified in their 
behavior which utilizes their relationship with tax officials and 
sees the behavior of other taxpayers as a reason to avoid their 
tax obligations. This can be seen from the magnitude of the 
responsibilities of tax officials in carrying out their duties in 
serving the public and the high view of taxpayers to estimate 
income which is not reported by looking at another people's 
behavior (Quality Relations: 4,163; Quality Decision: 4.1; 
Perceived Tax Evasion: 4 ). In this cluster it can be said that the 
Taxpayer and the environment where the Taxpayer is located 
has a correct view of the norm or rule (Personal Norms: 4.282; 
Social Norms: 4.3). But the taxpayers decide to do something 
based on what is observed from the environment. When the 
taxpayer feels that there is no fairness between the wages 
received and the obligations that must be paid, the taxpayers in 
this cluster will choose to carry out a tax evasion. There is a 
theory that can strengthen the assumptions of the author, 
namely Social learning theory that comes from psychology. 
Social learning theory is based on the idea that a person learns 
from interactions between that person and others in a social 
context. Separately, by observing other people's behavior, 
people develop similar behavior. After observing other people's 
behavior, people assimilate and imitate that behavior, especially 
if their observational experience is positive or includes rewards 
that are received well in relation to the behavior carried out.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This study classifies taxpayers based on several variables, 
namely; Personal Norms (PN), Social Norms (SN), Horizontal 
Fairness (HF), Vertical Fairness (VF), Exchange Fairness (EF), 
Quality Decision (QD), Quality Relations (QR), Perceived Tax 
Evasion (PTE), Technology, Tax Advances (TA), Tax 
Compliance and Tax Evasion. The independent variable helps 
in classifying taxpayers according to the main characteristics of 
the group. Based on the results of classification carried out by 
researchers, taxpayers are divided into 5 groups namely; 
Commitment, Sycophant, Submission, Offender, and 
Defrauder. Commitment Taxpayer is a taxpayer who complies 
with tax regulations voluntarily. Sycophant Taxpayer is a 
taxpayer who tends to utilize good relations with the tax 
authorities in completing tax obligations. Submission Taxpayer 
is a taxpayer who tends to want to avoid taxes but in fact still 
chooses to obey. Taxpayer Offender is a taxpayer who utilizes 
the weaknesses of taxation provisions to do tax avoidance. 
Defrauder Taxpayer is a taxpayer who from the beginning has 
the intention to conduct tax avoidance aggressively. The results 
of the study prove that the prospect theory influences the 
behavior of taxpayers. Taxpayers are classified into what 
clusters relate to how the attitude of taxpayers is influenced by 
the mindset when carrying out tax obligations. This research is 
expected to be a reference for the tax authorities in planning 
what policies should be taken to overcome differences in the 
characteristics of taxpayers when carrying out their tax 
obligations. In addition, due to data limitations and the scope of 
the study, further research can be developed by adding samples 
to obtain more accurate data. 
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